Quiet reading today, and perfect for the contemplation. I understood the measure to which Philosophy held Fortune, but seeing fortune as a state of being–aside from material things, which I well understand are transitory and little value in the long run:
"Moreover, if honor and power were by nature good in themselves, they would never be found in wicked men. For opposites are rarely found together, and nature abhors the union of contraries. Since there is no doubt that wicked men are often hnored, it is obvious that the kind of honor which can be ahieved by the wicked is not good." (Book II, Prose 6, p. 30)
At first reading of the above, it’s understood. Then the doubts creep in. Like saying that if money goes to evil men than money’s not worth having, in fact, is bad. This isn’t quite the full truth. Money, for all its bad connotations, is not in itself an evil thing. It’s just a medium by which we must survive and use as barter. And honor paid to the corrupt, is that not just by a hoodwinked crowd? Does it lessen the honor to be abused?
If publishing houses publish junk, is it less meaningful to the good works that are done as well? Maybe so. What should be strived for then, as goals and purpose? In this life, I mean. Or is this life, the gifts of which are given to both the virtuous and the evil, not meaningful at all? Again, an unwavering trust in a life beyond the grave in which the body lies must be accepted. How else to justify the inequalities on earth.
Further reading, I am sure, will clarify Philosophy’s advice and explanation. Right now, I do not see the sense in smugness that acceptance of all on earth would bring if when the passing is nothing more than past.
The Lost Children: A Charity Anthology
I wonder if Philosophy would agree with your comparison of a type of honor to money. This kind of distinction in this context is severely important for Boethius.
Honor and power are found in good people too. But are they good without it also?
I’m afraid I did get lazy in seeking a concrete analogy and fell back on the materialism of money for it. Boethius is more interested in his good name and honor. What I was trying to understand is more the idea of good being tainted by the bad. The papal position, for example, is highly regarded at least by Catholics, and yet many popes (Leos?) have been evil men. Does Philosophy say then that this position is to be disregarded because it does not rule out the possibility of achievement by those unworthy? It just sounded like sour grapes to me. i.e., Glimmer Train won’t accept my stories, yet I see some real stinkers in their publication. Shall I conclude they hold no honor for me then and so shall not be sought?
You say, “Honor and power are found in good people too. But are they good without it also?” I would say yes, as it is not what makes them good and worthy, but are the rewards of such instead. Is this then what Philosophy is saying? That the happiness comes in the being rather than in the man-made definition of the achievement? I would still argue (for now) that this ties just to the worldly presence, and Philosophy and Boethius are of the mind that that is not the real importance to mankind.
You write: “Does Philosophy say then that this position is to be disregarded because it does not rule out the possibility of achievement by those unworthy?” The position itself is problematic because people see “the position” as having some inherent merit. P would argue against this since, as you say, evil men have been in charge.
Consider it in another light: the presidency is an idea, while the president is a man or woman who could show egenerous amounts of evil, good, or whatever. But they cannot be respected simply because they are “the president.” Boethius here forms a foundational logic for a speech freedom. That aside, we can want a position of power because of the honor it confers, but to “rely” on it for happiness or well being can only lead to disappointment. Partly, “consolation” comes from not just knowing that but knowing why by working through the reasoning.
I would agree that the position or honor can be despoiled, but does that taint as well its original value for all time? To make it the basis of one’s happiness would be foolish, yes, because it does not automatically bring with it happiness, nor does it consent to be enduring. But if it is sought, or wanted, for its meaning–not of power but of its original connotation of honor, is that not something to strive for?
I suppose I’m still chewing on the notion of honor that comes from principle rather than title. That, and the idea of what can be lamented for its worthiness as personal good. Boethius pines for his good name, the muddying of it by others would, I think, be something to worry for. After all, whether there be a heaven of reward or just a tombstone, “a good and honorable man” endures beyond.