This logic may follow, but it is based on a premise that I don’t quite see as solid:
"Perhaps it may strike some as strange to say that evil men do not exist, especially since they are so numerous; but it is not so strange. For I do not deny that those who are evil are evil; but I do deny that they are, in the pure and simple sense of the term. For just as you may call a cadaver a dead man, but cannot call it simply a man, so I would concede that vicious men are evil, but I cannot say, in an absolute sense, that they exist. For a thing which is maintains its place in nature and acts in accord with its nature. Whatever fails to do this loses the existence which is proper to its nature. But you may argue that evil men are capable of action. I will not deny it, but such capability is the product of weakness, not of strength. For they can do evil acts which they could not have done if they had been able to remain capable of good. And that possibility of doing evil shows clearly that they can do nothing. For, if our earlier conclusion that evil is nothing still stands, it is clear that the wicked can do nothing since they can do only evil." (Book III, Prose 2, p. 71)
Though I’d like nothing better than to believe that evil men do not exist (even in Philosophy’s notion of existence), the logic is not on firm ground. It sounds a bit like the "I don’t believe in you" nyah nyah that made Tinkerbell’s light flicker and die in Peter Pan.
The statement, "For a thing which is maintains its place in nature and acts in accord with its nature. Whatever fails to do this loses the existence which is proper to its nature" assumes no variation in behavior. That which does not act in accordance with its nature, doesn’t exist? I may be nitpicky here, but it appears that most of the human race would not exist if this would be so. I realize we’re coming up on the notion of free will, but I need to get this aspect set firmly–just as all build one upon the other–before I can comprehend Philosophy’s explanation of free will.
This statement as well seems too overly simple: "For, if our earlier conclusion that evil is nothing still stands, it is clear that the wicked can do nothing since they can do only evil." There’s no leeway granted here, and the logic doesn’t take everything into account, but rather is dealing in absolutes (even for a black and white person such as I, who can still see a huge grey area in between). If we accept that evil is nothing, then I don’t see it clearly proven that they do nothing since they do not only do evil.
It’s a head scratcher to fully accept this without question and go further.
The Lost Children: A Charity Anthology
I agree completly, in the words of my philosophy teacher “it’s so bad it can’t even be wrong”, he/she contradicts themself at almost every turn. Who was he/she so we can throw eggs at them?
Susan,
This element of CoP may need some context. Boethius’ conception of the idea of divine and earthly order has a lot to do with what he’s into here. When Philosophy says “exist” she may be approximating a defining of a thing’s “place” in the natural order of things. A thing that doesn’t exist is a thing that is “out of place.”
Order descends concentrically from out to in in a divine view. The sun and jupiter never leave their spheres. People can.
Boethius is not talking about reality here.
J. – Sometimes the simplest explanations are the ones that need to be examined for their complexities, and this is why I am suspicious.
Steve – I understand that Philosophy’s use of existence is not taken literally, but rather that it should be presumed to be of no importance. However, and this is taking into consideration Boethius’ circumstance, Philosophy’s stance seems to pooh-pooh reality in favor of a higher state. This may be well and fine for comfort to someone who faces death (as do we all, but not in his certainty and immediacy) but it negates a purpose to life except to prepare for something beyond it.
I’m also not familiar with the divine order as moving towards a center–where’s that from?